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led by the great bulk of the community, they are subject to the privileged
which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to their lead-
ers, heroes, villains and victims." 19
Again, the privilege is not unlimited and may be exceeded when a
photograph is discovered to be indecent.20 As was noted by the dissenting
opinion, the majority of the court refused to examine the photograph in
question for unknown reasons. In order for any court to determine
whether or not a particular act violates common decencies and, therefore,
exceed the privilege, an act must be such that a reasonable man can see that
it might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to one pos-
sessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in like circumstances
of the plaintiff.21 In two decisions cited by the majority to support its
position, the courts very carefully examined the photographs in an at-
tempt to discover if they were indecent before dismissing the cause.22 It
is submitted that the instant case would be of greater value to this grow-
ing body of law had the court examined the photograph.
Thus, once the right is recognized by a court, it must then be deter-
mined if the privilege granted the press to invade an individual's right to
privacy is applicable. If it is, then the facts must be thoroughly examined
to ascertain whether or not any one of them violates common decencies.
The press should not be allowed under the guise of "news interest" to in-
vade an individual's right to privacy indiscriminately. However, because
of the practical difficulty confronting newspaper editors in determining
borderline cases at the risk of liability, the courts will undoubtedly con-
tinue to deal liberally with newspaper publications and therefore repeat-
edly rely on the "privilege" to defeat recovery.
19 Restatement of Torts, § 867, Comment C.
2 01t was said in: Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 231 P. 2d 565 (1951); Barber v.
Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d 291 (1942); Nelvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297
Pac. 91 (1931) that the privilege to disseminate news should not be abused so as to
violate common decencies.
21 Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. 2d 133 (1945).
22 Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E. 2d 344, 348 (1956). That court said:
"We might point out in this connection that from an observation of the pictures at-
tached to the record, it appears that a person viewing them could not identify the
deceased"; Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d 235, 236 (1956). The court
stated, "No mention was made of the plaintiff in the news story and nothing therein
or on the accompanying photograph showed any relationship between the plaintiff
and the deceased.'
TORTS-NON-PROFIT HOSPITAL LIABLE TO PAYING
PATIENT FOR NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff, a paying patient, brought an action against the defendant, a
non-profit hospital, for damages resulting from personal injuries sustained
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when plaintiff, while a patient in the defendant hospital, was negligently
permitted to fall from a hospital bed. While being treated for these in-
juries the defendant again negligently allowed the plaintiff to fall out of a
hospital bed and sustain further injuries. Defendant set up as a separate
defense the fact that it was a charitable institution. Plaintiff demurred to
the separate defense. The trial court overruled the demurrer and dis-
missed the case when the plaintiff failed to plead further. Plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment. An allow-
ance of a motion to certify the record brought the cause to the Supreme
Court of Ohio for review. The Supreme Court reversed for the plaintiff
and thus overruled its previous decisions by allowing a paying patient to
recover for a tort against a defendant charitable institution. Avellone v.
St. Jobn's Hospital, 135 N.E. 2d 410 (Ohio, 1956).
Ohio thus has followed what is considered the modern trend towards
the abrogation of the immunity doctrine allotted to charitable institutions
earlier in American case history.
This 1956 decision may be termed a culmination of the historical aboli-
tion of the immunity doctrine of charitable institutions in Ohio. In 1911
its courts established a rule of complete immunity but in 1922 recognized
an exception to this rule by imposing liability upon a charitable institu-
tion for injury caused by the negligent selection of servants by the insti-
tution. This was the only exception recognized until 1930 when the court
charged a charitable institution with tort liability for those who were
strangers, i.e., those not beneficiaries of its charity. After the decision of
1930, Ohio courts were granting immunity only as to patients termed
"beneficiaries of the charity" who could not prove the negligent selection
or retention of servants on the part of the institution. Quoting from the
Ohio case being noted:
In the final analysis the partial immunity of non-profit hospitals obtaining in
Ohio at the present time ... is based solely upon the general ground of public
policy.'
From this conclusion the court reasoned that there was no longer a basis
for immunity because, with the development of the various government
aid programs which also provide for payment of hospital bills and the
widespread use of hospitalization insurance, the reasons for sustaining
such a public policy no longer exist.
In Illinois, the immunity of charitable institutions is limited to the pro-
tection of the trust fund initially set up to finance the institution. Prior to
1950 such institutions in Illinois enjoyed complete immunity, but in that
year a decision was rendered extending the previous doctrine and estab-
I Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 135 N.E. 2d 410 (Ohio, 1956).
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lishing the theory of complete liability except for the protection of the
trust fund.2
This decision was based on the theory that immunity was designed to
protect the trust fund and, therefore, recovery out of non-trust funds or
assets should be allowed. Affirming this decision in 1954, the court con-
cluded that, "the rule is that immunity exists against the dissipation of
public funds in paying a tort judgment, but it is not a defense to tort ac-
tion." Thus the court settled a question left open until that time-whether
the lack of non-trust or public funds was a defense against the action or
merely against the execution of the judgment.
Joining with Illinois in limiting immunity only to the protection of the
trust fund are two other jurisdictions, Tennessee and Colorado.4
The most recent changes involving this area of tort liability have oc-
curred in Washington, Kansas and Idaho.' In 1953, the Supreme Court of
Washington overruled its previous decisions by holding that a non-profit
hospital is no longer immune from the liability for injuries to paying
patients caused by the negligence of its employees. Previous to this deci-
sion, non-profit hospitals in that jurisdiction enjoyed immunity with re-
spect to beneficiaries only where there was no negligence in the selection
and retention of the employee. Though they did not decide the point, it
appears from the reasoning that such hospitals would also be liable to non-
paying patients and thus bring such institutions in Washington under a
complete liability status.
The Supreme Court of Kansas then followed in 1954 with its new ruling
divesting charitable institutions of any immunity. Quoting from the court:
We now hold that charitable institutions are liable for torts of their servants
from which injury proximately results to a third person, whether stranger or
patient, and whether the patient is a paying or a non-paying patient.
Going further, the court stated that to exempt such institutions is con-
trary to "constitutional guarantees," and "in short destroys equality and
creates special privilege."
In the same year as the principal case, Idaho also overruled previous
decisions and charged a charitable hospital with liability to a paying
patient for injuries resulting from the negligence of its management or
employees.
2 Moore v. Moyle, 405 II. 555, 92 N.E. 2d 81 (1950).
a Tracy v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Il., 1954).
4 Edwards v. King's Mountain Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 118 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.
Tenn., 1954); St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952).
5 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 297 P. 2d 1041 (Idaho, 1954);
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P. 2d 934 (1954); Pierce v. Yakima
Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 ,Vash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).
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The Washington case of Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital
,4ss'n6 developed a brief history of the trend since 1943:
Since.. . 1943 four jurisdictions have abandoned the immunity rule, and in
the process, have overruled earlier decisions.7 ... Four other jurisdictions have,
during the same period, rejected immunity rule as a matter of first impression.8
... During this ten-year period no appellate court has joined the group which
favors immunity either as a matter of first impression or by overruling earlier
decisions which reject the doctrine.
To this historical development may be added the three decisions noted
above plus this Ohio ruling, thus setting forth a complete development of
the trend from 1943 to 1956.
From a brief analysis of these decisions, it is easy to detect the obvious
digression from what was once the unanimous doctrine of complete im-
munity to the new and growing doctrine which holds non-profit institu-
tions liable for torts in the same capacity as individuals and private cor-
porations.
Today there are nine states that still adhere to the theory of complete
immunity. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia may be categorized
as jurisdictions granting partial immunity, and seventeen states plus
Alaska and Puerto Rico hold for complete liability. Three states grant
immunity only to the extent of protecting the trust fund and three juris-
dictions have no decision on the subject."
An analysis of the problem reveals that the trend seems to be toward
a more balanced and equitable solution of the problem, since it now ap-
6 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765
(1953).
7 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951); Haynes v. Presby-
terian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W. 2d 151 (1950); Mississippi Baptist Hos-
pital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); Taverez v. San Juan, 68 Puerto Rico
681.
8 Moots v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546 (1952); Rickbeil v. Grafton
Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W. 2d 247 (1946); Foster v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A. 2d 230 (1950); Durney v. St. Francis Hospital,
83 A. 2d 753 (Del. Super., 1952).
9 Complete Immunity: Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina.
Partial Immunity: Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
Complete Liability: Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Utah, Vermont, Washington.
Protection of Trust: Colorado, Illinois, Tennessee.
No decision: Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota.
See 4 De Paul L.R. 56, 65 for classification, adjusted by recent decisions noted in
above text.
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pears that through the change of times and circumstances these institutions
are now able to protect themselves and no longer need the help of the
courts. Therefore, it would be contrary to good judgment and justice to
allow the individual to suffer alone without redress against those who were
responsible for the injury.
In this development there appears but one weakness. The public policy
theory which was the main foundation for the immunity doctrine in-
cluded a balancing of rights, viz., the rights of the charitable institu-
tion to any benefit and assistance that society and law could allow them
versus the right of the individual to recover from the master of such
servant injuring him. In weighing these rights of the individual in an at-
tempt to balance it against the right of the institution, it was noted that
many of the injured parties would only become wards of some other
charity if they were not allowed to collect. This was held to be a weighty
consideration on the part of the individual's rights and its influence upon
society in the problem. Yet in those jurisdictions in which the doctrine
of immunity has been gradually abrogated, invariably the last survivor has
always been the immunity against actions in tort by patients-and in par-
ticular non-paying patients-the real charity case. This seems inconsistent
because, if the courts looked upon this problem in the light of the greatest
benefit to society, which is what public policy actually means, then it
appears that when this wall of immunity was penetrated, the prime con-
sideration should have been given to the most needy, the class of non-
paying charity patients. Instead, all other less needy classes of individuals
w'ere allowed to collect before this right was restored to the charity
patient.' 0
10 Note discussion of immunity doctrine in 4 De Paul L.R. 56 (1954).
